Political Constraints on Evidence-Based Agricultural Reform in Sierra Leone

Abstract

In Sierra Leone, Agricultural Business Centres (ABCs) were created as a key part of post-conflict agriculture policy to improve farmer productivity, strengthen market access, and support rural livelihoods. This study examines how political decision-making limits the use of evidence in the reform and support of ABCs. The goal is to see if policy choices match with real performance data. Using data from 193 ABCs and two performance assessments, the paper takes a comparative approach to examine the link between measured outcomes and government support patterns and institutional reform. The findings show a consistent gap between evidence and policy. Political factors, especially regional equity, distribution pressures, and electoral incentives, often overshadow proven effectiveness in resource allocation decisions. As a result, high-performing centres do not always get the recognition they deserve, underperforming centres do not get enough restructuring, and there are limited chances for institutional learning. The study's uniqueness comes from blending large-scale performance evidence with political analysis, offering rare insights into how political incentives distort evidence-based policymaking in agriculture. The paper adds to the wider discussions on governance and development by illustrating that the main issue is not a lack of data, but the political limits on its use. It highlights the need for transparency, accountability, and collaborative policy frameworks to better connect scientific evidence with political decisions. This offers practical lessons for agricultural reform in Sierra Leone and similar development situations.